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Responsible innovation (RI) is founded on the idea that present modes of innovating with
science and technology fail because they insufﬁciently take into account societal needs and
values. Hence, proponents of RI solicit society’s opinions in an attempt to render science
and technology developments, institutions, and policies more socially responsive. This
article asks how the RI concept is taken up and elaborated, based on accounts developed on
the European Union policy level and on a Flemish, technology assessment level. It ﬁnds
that, notwithstanding important differences between these two deliberative frameworks,
neither one leaves much room for politics, understood as the constitution and contestation
of power. Rather, these frameworks largely ignore questions about the politics in and of
deliberation, the authoritative allocation of values, and the institutional uptake of
deliberative engagements. The article’s aim is to provide constructive criticism of the RI
paradigm by rendering these political issues explicit and proposing ways of taking them into
account.
Keywords: innovation; normativity; politics; power; responsibility; technology assessment
1. Introduction
In recent years, policy-makers, as well as various industry representatives, civil society organiz-
ations, and scientists, have called for the integration of societal and ethical considerations into
science and technology research and development (R&D). They have done so for various
reasons: to anticipate problems linked to the development of technologies; to create ﬂexible
and adaptive governance systems that better manage scientiﬁc and social uncertainties; and to
give citizens a voice in science policy-making, among others. These calls, and the motivations
that sustain them, build on a widely shared conviction among policy-makers, scientists, and aca-
demics that scientiﬁc expertise today faces a problem of legitimacy. Although science and tech-
nology are central to our lives and provide innumerous beneﬁts, scientists are under increased
pressure to justify their research activities and their knowledge claims to broader society
(Lövbrand, Pielke Jr., and Beck 2011). This pressure emanates from past and present public con-
troversies over nuclear power plant accidents, food scares, widespread environmental pollution,
and various other disputes dating back decades. It also coincides with the present-day crisis of
modern structures, as governments cannot democratically control important scientiﬁc decisions
and actions that directly bear on society, and the status of scientiﬁc knowledge is very much in
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question (Beck 1993). The analyses of the problem of modernization, as it is described here, are
not new. Nor are many of the proposed remedies, which policy-makers and scholars of science
and technology present today, and which include (but are not limited to) anticipatory governance,
technology assessment (TA), and upstream public engagement.
This article describes and examines what is arguably the latest major remediating concept to
have gained widespread policy and academic currency, at least in Europe: responsible research
and innovation (RRI), or simply responsible innovation (RI).1 Much like the aforementioned
notions, RI denotes an orientation toward anticipation, inclusiveness, responsiveness, and reﬂex-
ivity concerning science and technology and innovation processes more broadly (Owen,
Macnaghten, and Stilgoe 2012). As a closer examination of more or less established RI deﬁ-
nitions reveals, RI is founded on the idea that present modes of innovating with science and tech-
nology fail because they insufﬁciently take into account societal needs and values. Whereas,
science and technology have long been identiﬁed as a major source of economic and social
development (Schumpeter 1939; Kondratiev 1978); their contribution to social well-being is
no longer taken for granted (Pellizzoni 2012). Scholars in the increasingly inﬂuential ﬁeld of
science and technology studies (STS) criticize science and technology innovation policies for
neglecting fundamental ethical principles or normative baselines for acceptable risks and precau-
tionary measures. From this policy-critical point of view, scientiﬁc innovation processes are
inadequate because they elicit public unease and pre-empt debate on the need, direction, and
desirability of innovation at large. What is therefore needed is a shift in thinking and acting
in terms of risk and regulation to the prior social shaping of science and technology through
‘innovation governance’ (Felt et al. 2007).
In line with these suggestions and commitments, proponents of RI solicit society’s opinions in
an attempt to render science and technology developments, institutions, and policies more
socially responsive. Solicitation typically takes the form of broad consultations involving as
many relevant stakeholders as possible, in ways that enhance inclusiveness, transparency, and
deliberation, and that promise greater beneﬁts to society than economic growth and technological
advance only (Wynne 2001). As RI is very much a policy innovation project in the making, its
boundaries are not yet determined or ﬁxed; rather, they are continuously expanded and
redrawn. Accordingly, RI proponents may include STS scholars, as well as policy-makers,
civil society organizations, scientists, industry representatives, and also citizens. Given its uncer-
tain, open-ended character, perhaps the best way of understanding RI today is as an emerging dis-
course on how to properly enact a democratic governance of innovation (Stilgoe, Owen, and
Macnaghten 2013).
This article asks how the RI concept is taken up and elaborated based on accounts developed
on the European Union (EU) policy level and on a local, more scholarly grounded, TA level in
Flanders, Belgium. It ﬁnds that, notwithstanding important differences between these two delib-
erative frameworks, neither one leaves much room for politics, understood as the constitution and
contestation of power. Rather, these frameworks largely ignore questions about the politics in
deliberation (e.g. how actors craft RI through strategic use of argument and other advantage-
seeking techniques), as well as the politics of deliberation (e.g. how RI privileges a process deﬁ-
nition of democracy at the cost of participatory and representative perspectives). In addition, these
frameworks forsake questions about the authoritative allocation of values (as in formalized, repre-
sentative politics) and the institutional uptake of deliberative engagements more broadly. The
article’s aim is to render these issues explicit in an attempt to develop more politically sensitive
and critical RI practices.
While in recent years, STS scholars have developed critically reﬂexive analyses of the role
that politics and power play in deliberative processes, these analyses are not sufﬁciently taken
into account in action-oriented STS approaches. In fact, a longstanding criticism of such
68 M. van Oudheusden
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 L
ieg
e],
 [m
ich
iel
 va
n o
ud
he
us
de
n]
 at
 07
:18
 04
 A
pr
il 2
01
4 
approaches is that although they concern themselves with political and normative issues in
science and technology, and despite their understanding that science is not a neutral, disinterested
enterprise, they fail to critically engage with their own norms and politics (Radder 1992; Fuller
2000; Genus 2006; Pestre 2008). With a few notable exceptions (e.g. Bora and Hausendorf
2004; Loeber 2004a), there is also a general lack of empirical consideration of how participatory
science is enacted in practice (Abels 2007). An important aim of this article is therefore to sen-
sitize practitioners and interested others to the growing body of literature that highlights the pol-
itical and normative dimensions in STS. These dimensions include the need to establish quality
criteria for good science and technology participation (Rowe and Frewer 2000), consideration of
how dialog and engagement processes construct particular publics, such as citizens (Michael and
Brown 2005; Lezaun and Soneryd 2007; Turnhout, Van Bommel, and Aarts 2010), the use and
effects of framing in participatory practice and how ‘participation’ is crafted and conditioned
by the exercise of political power (Stirling 2006; Wynne 2006; Kerr et al. 2007), as well as
more general reﬂections on how and why to evaluate engagements between scientists, citizens,
and others (Guston 1999).
Although the article does not elaborate each of these topics, it may contribute to enhancing
awareness among RI practitioners of how several of the above concerns play out in real-world
deliberative science and technology spaces. Following Delgado, Kjølberg, and Wickson
(2010), ‘engagement practices’ in science and technology (whether deemed deliberative, partici-
patory or public) always elicit tensions and resistance. In the cases presented in this article, the
tensions pertain to how the terms of engagement are set and enacted rather than theorized to
occur, the potentially conﬂicting aims embedded in RI and TA missions and methods, and the
ambiguous relationship between deliberative, participatory, and representative modes of
‘doing’ engagement, among others. By attending to these concerns, the article opens a space
for ‘collective self-criticism, imagination, and the disposition to learn from trial and error’
among proponents of innovation governance (Barben et al. 2008, 992). At best, the analysis it
offers may lead to alternative conceptions of deliberation and governance, which can then be con-
sidered, weighed, and assessed against each other. At the very least, it should encourage reﬂection
on the challenges of governing innovation and careful consideration on how and why challenges
emerge, and what can and should be done about them.
The article is structured as follows. First, I present and situate RI in academic and policy tra-
ditions to better understand where RI comes from and what it purports to be. I draw connections
with other schools and traditions, such as anticipatory governance, to indicate that proponents of
RI typically present RI along procedural lines rather than political ones; that is, they emphasize
the importance of talk, deliberative argumentation, and due procedure without attending to ques-
tions of power, ends, and authority that play out in, and through, RI processes. Contrary to this
dominant procedural reading of RI, I contend that RI is normative in character and purpose, as RI
advocates contest, and seek to transform, contemporary sociotechnical regimes. Hence, the poli-
tics of RI demand to be explored and have to be accounted for (Wesselink and Hoppe 2011;
Owen, Macnaghten, and Stilgoe 2012), which I do in Section 2. In Section 3, I give a more situ-
ated account of how RI is enacted in the Flemish TA practice ‘Nanotechnologies for Tomorrow’s
Society’ (NanoSoc). The NanoSoc project sought to integrate societal concerns into ongoing tech-
nology R&D and render nanoscientists and -technologists aware of the social and ethical dimen-
sions of nanotechnology development. I draw critical attention to the lack of consideration for
politics in the NanoSoc project and the consequences this lack has for NanoSoc, TA, and RI
discourses and practices. The analysis serves to open a space for a more politically robust RI
practice that is cognizant, and even appreciative, of politics in a broad sense, and thus attends
to the workings of power in and through RI (Foucault 1982).
Journal of Responsible Innovation 69
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2. Introducing RI
Although no single, authoritative description of RI exists and the RI concept is rapidly evolving,
von Schomberg (2011a, 9), a notable and often-cited proponent of RI, provides a more or less
concise working deﬁnition:
Responsible Research and Innovation is a transparent, interactive process by which societal actors and
innovators becomemutually responsive to each other with a view to the (ethical) acceptability, sustain-
ability and societal desirability of the innovation process and itsmarketable products (in order to allow a
proper embedding of scientiﬁc and technological advances in our society). (Emphasis added)
From this deﬁnition, we learn that: (1) RI is an interactive process that actively solicits society’s
opinion about innovation processes and (2) the aim of RI is to render innovation more ethically
acceptable, sustainable, and socially desirable.
Although other deﬁnitions offer different emphases from von Schomberg’s, RI is typically
presented as an inclusive, interactive procedure that, ideally, produces more effective policy out-
comes.2 Consider in this light the rather lengthy deﬁnition of RRI provided in 2013 by an Expert
Group to the EU’s Directorate General for Research and Innovation:
Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) refers to the comprehensive approach of proceeding in
research and innovation in ways that allow all stakeholders that are involved in the processes of
research and innovation at an early stage (A) to obtain relevant knowledge on the consequences of
the outcomes of their actions and on the range of options open to them and (B) to effectively evaluate
both outcomes and options in terms of societal needs and moral values and (C) to use these consider-
ations (under A and B) as functional requirements for design and development of new research, pro-
ducts and services. The RRI approach has to be a key part of the research and innovation process and
should be established as a collective, inclusive and system-wide approach. (Sutcliffe 2011, 55–56;
emphasis added)
As in von Schomberg’s deﬁnition, we discern in the Expert Group’s characterization a similar
concern with due process, inclusiveness, and functionality.
Last, consider the following description of RI provided by the EFC (2012), an EU-based phi-
lanthropic organization that works directly for EU policy-makers:
Building on the success of Science in Society projects in engaging the general public and civil society
in debates around science, RR&I aims to go one step further and engage all societal actors – from
researchers through policy makers, to citizens, businesses, etc. – to work together throughout the
research and innovation process in order to ensure that the results meet the needs of the world we
live in. (http://www.efc.be/news_events/Pages/From-Science-in-Society.aspx, Emphasis added)
Each of these deﬁnitions is linked to European policy processes and values and is drawn upon in
the academic and policy literature (Stilgoe, Owen, and Macnaghten 2013). If we were now to
approach RI as a frame package (Entman 1993), we would ﬁnd that these more or less recognized
RI deﬁnitions explicitly or implicitly convey a problem deﬁnition, moral evaluation, and treat-
ment recommendation. These framing components can be summarized as follows:
. Problem deﬁnition: The introduction of science and technology into society fails when this
process and the values it stands for conﬂict with societal values.3
. Moral evaluation: Societal needs and values need/deserve to be heard.
. Treatment recommendation: The scientiﬁc, policy, and industry communities must solicit
society’s opinions by listening to what society has to say about science and technology
innovations.
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In other words, RI offers an evaluation of a given sociotechnical context that RI proponents
believe is problematic, or even irresponsible. It is this normative, evaluative character of RI
that concerns us, rather than the speciﬁc wordings in deﬁnitions, as RI urges reconsideration of
the existing technoscientiﬁc order and its modes of production. I turn to this normative orientation
and what it entails shortly. First, I embed RI in a longer constructivist-deliberative governance
tradition in order to gain a richer understanding of the RI agenda.4
2.1. Where have we heard this before? RI in context
The terms RI and RRI have a history stretching back to other innovation-related concepts and fra-
meworks that emerged over a decade ago both in the USA and in Europe.5 As proponents of RI
readily acknowledge, the RI conception of technological change builds on social constructivist
studies of science and technology, such as anticipatory governance, upstream public engagement,
and TA. Thus, it is not surprising to ﬁnd in a RRI Report for the Directorate General Research and
Innovation of the European Commission, the ‘action tank’ MATTER an explicit link to ‘antici-
patory governance’:
RRI is about trying to get better at anticipating problems, taking into account wider social, ethical and
environmental issues and being able to create ﬂexible and adaptive systems to deal with these unin-
tended consequences. This is sometimes called ‘Anticipatory Governance’. (Sutcliffe 2011, 3)
Explicit references to anticipatory governance are equally found in von Schomberg (2011a,
2011b), as are the notions of (early) TA and public engagement, which is hardly surprising
given von Schomberg’s background and involvement in TA, predominantly in the Netherlands.
At the heart of RI then, lie concepts that resonate with understandings, assumptions, and
motivations that have been developed in academic and policy circles over the years, and that
have been articulated in various outlets. Let us now consider how notions like anticipatory gov-
ernance connect to other programmatic science–society discourses that have emerged in the past
decades, and to particular technologies, such as nanotechnologies. The aim here is not to be
exhaustive but to relate concepts in ways that reﬂect how they are mobilized in academic and
policy literatures, and to explore their normative content.
In their assessment of new and emerging technologies like nanotechnologies, Barben et al.
(2008, 979) contend that there is now a widespread understanding, both in the USA and in
Europe, that nanotechnologies constitute ‘an emerging set of science-based technologies with
the collective capacity to remake social, economic, and technological landscapes’. Due to its
novelty, complexity, uncertainty, and publicity, ‘nanotechnology represents ‘postnormal
science’ (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993)’, which requires ‘the engagement of a variety of potential
users and stakeholders in the production of knowledge (Gibbons et al. 1994), as well as new
organizations that span the boundary between knowledge production and public action’.
Although Barben et al. write from the context of nanotechnologies speciﬁcally, their assess-
ment equally applies to other sciences and technologies. I single out their argumentation, as it
frames sociotechnical governance as an institutional response to a perceived crisis in the govern-
ment of science and also explicitly relates concepts and techniques in the (sociological) literature,
notably ‘postnormal science’ (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993) and ‘socially robust knowledge’, as
introduced by Gibbons et al. (1994). Both of these concepts inform contemporary research and
policy worldwide (Hessels and Van Lente 2008, 743, 758; Turnpenny, Jones, and Lorenzoni
2011, 288). In addition, as I clarify below, the TA project NanoSoc is a deliberative experiment
in support of what Barben et al. call anticipatory governance of nanotechnologies, and is therefore
also grounded in postnormal conceptions of science in society.
Journal of Responsible Innovation 71
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Following Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990, 66), postnormal science denotes a science situation
where normal puzzle-solving is obsolete, as new sciences like oncology and epidemiology, for
instance, can never evoke a dogmatic consensus that ‘enforces adherence to a closed set of
rules for puzzle-solving’. Accordingly, Funtowicz and Ravetz (1994, 198) state the case for par-
ticipatory science and the democratization of expertise: ‘[a]s the policy process becomes a dialo-
gue, post-normal science encompasses the multiplicity of legitimate perspectives and
commitments, and provides new norms of evidence and discourse’. They strongly recommend
that stakeholders with interest in the (scientiﬁc) issue under investigation take part in the
process of quality assessment of information and, possibly, in the actual research procedure
with the aim of introducing into technical decision-making social and political value consider-
ations (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1994, 205).
Similarly, although different in scope and arguably less programmatic in character, Michael
Gibbons and his co-authors argue that new kinds of knowledge generation are in the making
that will have profound implications for how we understand science in the future (Gross
2006). The authors maintain that contrary to traditional science, which is investigator-initiated
and discipline-based, contemporary science is context-driven, problem-focused, and interdisci-
plinary. New modes of organizing science are emerging, which are more egalitarian and have
broader social relevance. The authors label the former kind of science Mode 1, and the latter
kind Mode 2 science.
In more recent work, Gibbons, along with Nowotny and Scott (2001), also derive implications
for the quality control of science. They propose the notion of ‘socially robust knowledge’ as a way
of dealing with conﬂict and uncertainty in modern societies. The aim of science, they write,
should be to produce knowledge for public ends, as science that is socially detached is too
fragile to meet various social pressures.
I do not further expound on the concepts of postnormal science and socially robust knowledge
in this article. My purpose is merely to indicate that RI builds on earlier constructivist analyses
and frameworks that intend to open up science and technology to (public) debate and reﬂection.6
More importantly, these theories propose a problem analysis and remedy that is fairly similar to
what we ﬁnd in RI concepts and accordant tools today. Because they purport a different sociotech-
nical order to be, they are normative in character; that is, they hint at a more inclusive, democratic,
and equitable science–society relationship than is presently the case. They also imply speciﬁc
arrangements of power and technique, which typically rest on a vision of true democracy as a
deliberative, cooperative, and broad way of dealing with social conﬂicts, and the conviction
that social learning is morally superior to political bargaining, to give but a few examples.
Like anticipatory governance, public engagement, and deliberative strands of TA, RI should
therefore be ascribed a normative orientation and political function, as RI invokes standards
and moral principles for actors to follow, (re)distributes roles and responsibilities among them
and (re)directs contributions toward particular outcomes.7 This normative orientation also
helps to explain why advocates of RI are primarily concerned with democratically interfering
in scientiﬁc practice and with developing the right procedures for involvement (see Nahuis and
Van Lente 2008).
2.2. Where are the politics?
Having brieﬂy introduced the RI concept, and having connected RI to other constructivist-
deliberative strands and traditions, let us now open RI to criticism and to ‘politicization’, in an
attempt to remedy its shortcomings. I single out three political critiques of RI, so to speak. The
ﬁrst deals with the lack of consideration within the RI framework for the politics in deliberation;
the second with how RI privileges a process deﬁnition of democracy at the cost of representative
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perspectives, i.e. the politics of deliberation; and the third with how RI forsakes questions about
the authoritative allocation of values.
2.2.1. The politics in deliberation
From a concern with instigating sociotechnical change, RI proponents seek to bring multiple
publics and their ‘knowledges’ into science and technology decision-making. Hence, they call
for ‘transparent, interactive processes’ and for ‘the involvement of all stakeholders’ in sociotech-
nical governance. However, RI proponents have little to nothing to say about the politics and
power that play out in, and through, deliberative governance processes. How do actors
‘co-create’ outcomes? How do they deliberate? On whose terms is participation (i.e. deliberation)
established, and why? What, in fact, is ‘public’ about the ‘public interest’, ‘public expectations’,
and ‘the public’, and whose deﬁnition of the public counts?
In the EC’s RRI report, the authors do raise questions about how responsibility in innovation
gets apportioned and distributed. They also ask what collective responsibility means ‘in a world
that is characterized by chance, complexity and emergence’ (EC 2013, 55). These questions are
distinctly political in nature; however, they are relegated to one of the annexes to the report. Fur-
thermore, they are simply raised rather than addressed. Similarly, the second (two-page long)
chapter of the report, which purportedly addresses the question of RI ‘operationalization’ in
the European Research Area, fails to specify how RI can be successfully applied on the EU
level and in member states (EC 2013, 23–24).
In von Schomberg’s (2011a, 8) TA-like rendition of RI, the importance of due process through
‘a deliberative extension of the science–policy interface’ is posited rather than speciﬁed and
developed. Although von Schomberg (2009) proposes an array of tried and tested governance
instruments, including ‘codes of conduct and various deliberative assessment mechanisms
within and outside the policy context’, we are still left with the question of how responsibility
is assigned and how deliberation is effectuated in practice, particularly in circumstances when
interests, values, and stakes collide rather than align. As critics of deliberative democracy point
out, any work of collective crafting is constituted through acts of power, such as control and
exclusion (Mouffe 1999). Thus, we must always ask how (deliberative) process and outcomes
are constituted in real-life settings rather than assuming, or project, an inclusive weighing of inter-
ests. For the same reason, we must ask questions that pertain to the distribution of power, such as:
Who is involved in designing solutions and who is left out? Who is a relevant actor and who is
not? When is a solution sufﬁciently ‘robust’? While many RI advocates appeal to process criteria
for participation (e.g. fairness), there is little to no empirical evidence of how deliberation at hand
is accomplished in RI settings. How are outcomes actually negotiated in interaction? How is pro-
cedure in fact done? To convincingly answer these questions, it is necessary to pay sustained,
micro-level empirical attention to the concrete, situated interactions between participants in an
RI setup (Abels 2007; Van Oudheusden 2011a).
2.2.2. The politics of deliberation
Second, and closely related to the previous point, the mere act of positing a common good reﬂects
a politically motivated choice. As Wesselink and Hoppe (2011) argue in relation to postnormal
science, including wider publics (e.g. citizens) in science is not a politically neutral thing to
do, yet ‘postnormalists’ typically frame interaction between scientists and wider society as cogi-
tation rather than as a process that involves the strategic use of power and inﬂuence. This framing
ignores how a deliberative context is ‘by deﬁnition coloured by the ideology and worldviews of
the underlying concept of democracy and political legitimacy’ (Mayer 1997, 9). Clearly, in an RI
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context, deliberative modes of truth making – reasoning, reciprocity, mutual learning, and foster-
ing transdisciplinarity – have legitimacy, which potentially undermines traditional expertise and
representation (Abels 2007). To give an example, from a TA point of view, ‘expertise’ is a nego-
tiated attribute (Nahuis and Van Lente 2008); hence, expertise is not considered to be the prero-
gative of scientists or other formally recognized experts but of publics more broadly. In
deliberative engagements, this extension of the notion of expertise very often elicits tensions
between formally recognized experts and lay persons over what constitutes evidence and who
is entitled to speak, when, why, and on behalf of whom or what (Eden 1996; Cook, Pieri, and
Robbins 2004; Van Oudheusden and De Zutter 2012).
Second, RI is clearly motivated by a concern for integrating social and ethical concerns into
science. Thus, it would appear that participants who do not endorse deliberation or a commitment
to deliberation and do not prioritize social and ethical concerns (not to mention environmental
concerns) over economic ones are placed on asymmetrical footing even before deliberation has
ofﬁcially begun. The point is not to argue that advocates of RI should forsake their political com-
mitments and preferences. Rather, they must acknowledge the inherent political bias in the way
the RI agenda is set up, as scientists, politicians, civil society representatives, and citizens may
resist dialog on the deliberative terms set by initiators of deliberation. Furthermore, the same,
or other, actors may contest the RI premise that existing democratic institutions are unsuitable
to tackle contemporary complex sociotechnical problems (Gethmann 2002).
2.2.3. The authoritative allocation of values8
While it is acknowledged that deliberative processes can in some instances impact on traditional,
representative decision-making, elected representatives are publicly mandated to enforce policy
decisions; whereas, deliberative democrats lack an ofﬁcial decision-making mandate.9 In the
case of RI speciﬁcally, it remains to be seen how grand responsibility principles, such as
gender, equality, responsibility, and so on, which are, for instance, invoked in von Schomberg’s
voluntary codes of conduct, can effectively be enforced. Even if we were to assume for a moment
that deliberation effectively leads to better policies and better policy-making, it remains to be seen
how those outcomes can be made to count in the science and policy arenas. Hence, those in favor
of deliberation should learn to wield political inﬂuence and strategies in order to effectuate more
visible, short- and middle-term impacts, rather than insisting only on the importance of long-term
policy planning and thinking (Wesselink and Hoppe 2011). They would also do well to take into
account the observation found in numerous political studies that power elites (i.e. policy-makers)
are disinclined to cede formal power to third parties, such as institutions and citizens, as these
elites ‘owe their position to representative democracy’ (Loeber 2004b).
To ground the above points of criticism in a practical RI setting, I next describe and discuss the
Flemish TA project ‘NanoSoc’. Although the NanoSoc project was launched well before the EU’s
RI agenda and grew out of the Flemish innovation context speciﬁcally, the project aligns with von
Schomberg’s working deﬁnition of RI, as it built on his conceptions of responsibility in research
and innovation (NPD 2005) and drew on related TA frameworks.10
3. RI in practice: NanoSoc
‘NanoSoc’ materialized in 2006 in response to a concerted call from Flemish policy-makers,
industries, and R&D directors to develop new forms of collaboration in which all social actors
stimulate technology innovation and R&D receives broad public support (Goorden et al.
2008a, 171; Goorden et al. 2008b). Contrary to most programs funded by the Flemish Institute
for the Advancement of Innovation through Science and Technology (IWT), social scientists
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(TA researchers) coordinated the project from the start, rather than technologists or natural scien-
tists. A year before the project ofﬁcially took off, project leaders had taken preliminary steps to
enroll nanotechnologists and -scientists at two different Flemish research institutes, acquire the
necessary funding, and lay the groundwork for a deliberative research methodology. Upon devel-
oping their research framework, they built on their prior experiences with new science and tech-
nology developments (e.g. in the area of biotechnologies). They also took inspiration from
contemporary TA approaches, such as constructive TA (Schot and Rip 1997), real-time TA
(Guston and Sarewitz 2002), interactive TA (Grin, Van de Graaf, and Hoppe 1997), and public
engagement – four approaches that seek to publicly assess technology before R&D are locked
in and applications appear on the market (Macnaghten, Kearnes, and Wynne 2005). NanoSoc
initiators thus sought to open scientiﬁc practice to societal inﬂuence and debate. They conceived
of the emergence of new and potentially disruptive technologies like nanotechnologies as an
opportunity for societies to come up with new, more robust science policies and programs.
In line with the aforementioned TA frameworks, the logic behind NanoSoc was one of
‘co-responsibility’ toward innovation, as both technology promoters (scientists and technologists,
as well as businesses and industrialists) and technology demanders (civil society, nonscientist citi-
zens, etc.) had to take into consideration one another’s needs and concerns if the project was to have
general social relevance (Goorden et al. 2008a, 175). Co-responsibility equally implies that scien-
tists have responsibilities not only to their profession but also to society as a whole, particularly in
face of the increasingly tight coupling between science and industry. As NanoSoc was both trans-
disciplinary and interactive by design, those involved deliberatively constructed answers to per-
ceived challenges, roles, and principles, and did so in an attempt to integrate scientiﬁc, social,
ecological, and other concerns into strategic research agendas.
NanoSoc also drew on postnormal conceptions of science and built on the frameworks of RI
and anticipatory governance as a means of ‘handling the demands of postnormal science’ (Barben
et al. 2008, 986). As the project’s initiators argued, innovation actors (scientists, engineers,
policy-makers, and others) today confront three forms of uncertainty: strategic uncertainty,
research complexity, and public ambivalence (Goorden et al. 2008a, 164–167). The ﬁrst two
kinds of uncertainty relate to the goal-searching nature of nanotechnology. Because nanotechnol-
ogy can be applied in different ways, nanotechnology R&D can be steered in multiple, even diver-
ging, directions, depending on which kinds of sciences are involved and which theories and
visions are mobilized in the process. Similarly, because nanotechnology serves both as an
enabling technology for other technologies and also converges with other technologies such as
biotechnology, the scope of ‘nano’ path formations is extremely wide. Accordingly, nanotechnol-
ogy research is conducted in a heterogeneous manner with research managers dedicating substan-
tial resources to research initiatives that are fragmented and often lack coherence.
In addition, various interests are at play in nano R&D, which often remain implicit and are
insufﬁciently understood even by technology promoters themselves. Contrary to a range of
other technologies, nanotechnologies are not driven by a shared public expectation or political
justiﬁcation, nor are they associated with any particular promise. Rather, because nanotechnology
is still in its infancy, a multitude of middle-range and more speculative, long-term visions are
developed. These visions include both inﬂated promises (e.g. nanotechnology as the ‘next revo-
lution’) and doomsday scenarios (e.g. self-replicating ‘nanobots’ that are out to destroy human-
ity). As Grünwald (2004, 54) argues, longer range visions linked to ‘nano’ are ambivalent in
nature: ‘positive visions could be re-interpreted as negative ones at the same time, hopes of
some people may be fears of others, or judgments may vary over time’. Hence, for NanoSoc
initiators the question was one of ‘streamlining’ efforts in nanotechnology in ways that reduce
the above complexities, or at least allow actors to manage them constructively together
(Goorden and Deblonde 2011, 4).
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3.1. The case for co-responsibility
Based on its scope and aims, it can be argued that NanoSoc carried the notion of RI a step further
than we have seen thus far. Rather than appealing to abstract principles only (e.g. sustainable
development) as embedded in (European) codes of conduct, the project instigated an ongoing,
deliberative role-principle dialog on technoscientiﬁc responsibility that implicated wider
society and scientists on the work ﬂoor, ultimately with the aim of developing an interactive meth-
odology for socially responsible nanotechnology development.
As NanoSoc operated on the understanding that technology innovation is a co-responsible
enterprise to which both the enactors of science and technologies (i.e. technology developers
and promoters, such as scientists, engineers, and product managers, who seek to realize new tech-
nologies) and comparative selectors (regulative authorities, pressure groups, citizen-consumers)
contribute, it was designed to engage a multiplicity of actors in a mutual learning process, includ-
ing nanoscientists, stakeholders, and citizens.11 To initiate prospective reﬂection and future-
oriented debate, participants were asked two overarching questions: (1) Which nanotechnology
trajectories (developments) are likely or possible? and (2) Which trajectories are worthwhile or
desirable for a future society? Thus, participants looked ﬁrst for which future nanotechnology tra-
jectories they deemed probable, to then discuss which trajectories were worth elaborating and
reﬁning. The ﬁrst question was addressed in an exploration stage and a visioning stage; the
second in a normative stage and a design stage.
I do not expound on these stages in this article. Sufﬁce it to say that NanoSoc can be read both
as a situated enactment of, and precursor to, TA-driven RI, as the project sought to provide par-
ticipants and innovation actors with incentives to systematically reﬂect on the embedding of tech-
nology in Flemish society. As mentioned above, the more speciﬁc focus was on rendering
scientists aware of societal needs in relation to nanotechnologies and having scientists at the
two nanotech institutes involved in NanoSoc consider how to integrate these needs into
nascent R&D strategies.
3.2. Again: where are the politics?
Given the close connections between NanoSoc and the RI framework at large, it is instructive to
draw parallels between the criticisms of RI presented earlier and the NanoSoc process. Hence, in
this section, I again raise the question, ‘where are the politics?’, but do so speciﬁcally in relation to
NanoSoc. As earlier, I focus on the politics in deliberation, the politics of deliberation, and the
authoritative allocation of values.
3.2.1. The politics in deliberation
In the NanoSoc project description (NPD 2005), the scientist/technologist is presented as ‘part of
the community of ‘seekers’ who do research to ﬁnd solutions for a common problem’. Similarly,
in a 2008 NanoSoc publication, we read that each actor in NanoSoc ‘contributes his/her (incom-
plete) views and perspectives and confronts them with those of others’ with the aim of achieving
creative solutions to sociotechnical challenges (Goorden et al. 2008a, 164). As these quotes indi-
cate, the central premise of the NanoSoc project was that decisions, policies, and assessments
would beneﬁt in quality from the inclusion of as many viewpoints as possible; thus enabling
factors that previously escaped technical decision-making to be captured and integrated into
science and technology policy (Cass 2006, 9).
While it is of course always possible that participants work together on a shared project in
good faith, little to nothing was said about how various stakes and interests may collide, or
how differences between actors are resolved (or conversely, suppressed). It was simply
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assumed that the involvement of more actors and issues in science would lead to better science
policy and enhance scientiﬁc quality. This assumption leaves open the questions as to what
‘better’ practice and ‘quality’ in science amount to and how the deﬁnitions of these terms are ulti-
mately established.12 Yet, from the project’s outset to its ofﬁcial closure, various project partici-
pants, as well as actors more tangentially involved in NanoSoc (e.g. nanotechnologists’
colleagues and employers, citizens, and policy-makers), often invoked a deﬁcit understanding
of participation in science and technology, predicated on the assumption that publics are ignorant
of scientiﬁc facts, and therefore, need scientiﬁc education. This deﬁcit understanding contrasts
with repertoires conventionally deployed by TA practitioners, which construct publics as credible
participants in the process of knowledge construction, and underline the need of bringing in
various kinds of expertise (scientiﬁc, sociological, lay) in scientiﬁc practices and decision-
making (Epstein 1995). The problem was not that deﬁnitions conﬂicted or that disagreement
about deliberative aims and means persisted, but that these conﬂict dynamics were not picked
up and acted on in NanoSoc. Rather than inquiring into how deliberation evoked different, if
not divergent, expectations and responses, NanoSoc initiators repeatedly appealed to cooperation
and collaboration on behalf of all participants as a means of handling nanotechnology challenges
and concerns. As described elsewhere, and as project initiators themselves acknowledge, these
appeals did not prove effective (Van Oudheusden and De Zutter 2012).
In short, because cooperation and collaboration were taken for granted, NanoSoc participants
had free reign to construct their own versions of deliberation without engaging in reciprocal
exchanges or probing their own assumptions, as the spirit of deliberative inquiry demands.
This general lack of consideration for the politics in deliberation rendered NanoSoc vulnerable
to strategic game playing and to various forms of ‘noncommunicative’ behavior on behalf of
those involved, as some participants, for various reasons, resisted interaction on deliberative
terms. As a consequence, participation in NanoSoc became impracticable and even undercut
the deliberative process, which initiators sought to sustain.
Thus, although NanoSoc provided each participant with ample room to articulate and develop
her own conception of deliberation, appeals to collaboration, sharing, reciprocity, and uncon-
strained dialog remained problematic because there were no checks and balances that regulated
power-in-interaction. Inviting participants to engage in respectful dialog does not guarantee
that they will contribute their thoughts and ideas, or do so in a fair manner, even when prompted.
True to the spirit of deliberation, actors in a TA cannot be forced to commit ideas and resources;
thus, there is no mechanism to control disruptive behavior. I therefore urge deliberative TA prac-
titioners to develop such mechanisms to ensure more trustworthy and legitimate deliberative pro-
cesses. These measures should go well beyond the usual calls for facilitation by ‘neutral’
facilitators, which are usually based on a desire of having participants get along with one
another.13 Instead, TA practitioners (or other researchers) could deploy a range of data-driven
techniques (e.g. audio and video recordings of deliberation) in order to discern and analyze recur-
ring patterns of interaction between participants. These analyses could be fed back into delibera-
tive processes as a means of attending participants to the rationalities at work in deliberation and
subjecting their interactions to social control. In conjunction with such techniques, admittedly
arduous, one may think of semi-structured interactions with participants before, during, and
after deliberative engagements centered on the question of what is at stake for them and how
they perceive the stakes of others, as well as whether they perceive the deliberative process to
be useful and legitimate. While it may be impractical for TA practitioners to delve into each
and every response to these questions, it should be possible to extract recurring themes and
subject these to collective discussion so that deliberative aims and procedures can be revised
along the way.
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Taking these lines of reasoning a step further, participants could also be asked whether and
where they see domination (i.e. coercion or repression) at work in deliberation. Following Fou-
cault (1988, 18), relations of power cannot be dissolved in communication; hence, participants
should be allowed to engage in games of power as a means of channeling and regulating it (Flyvb-
jerg 1998). When, and if, these games transgress into repression or other forms of political vio-
lence, TA practitioners must ask why these transgressions occur. To my mind, this question is
even more important than the need to restrain disruptive conduct, as a collective exploration of
the interests of all parties in a TA impinges on the nature of deliberation itself. Because the ques-
tion is needs-centered (rather than process- or outcome-centered), it opens a possibility of rethink-
ing and recrafting deliberative engagement in a manner that is more likely to enhance the
legitimacy of deliberative TA among all involved parties.
In sum, TA practitioners would do well to take the rationalities of conﬂict and power as the
point of departure rather than commitments to sharing and dialog. While collaboration and con-
sensus seeking are of course a vital and genuine element of deliberation, the legitimacy of delib-
eration also depends on how the collision of stakes and interests is managed.
3.2.2. The politics of deliberation
A second tension worth attending to is the lack of a democratic theory in NanoSoc (and delib-
erative TA practice at large). The NanoSoc process was designed to broaden both the range of
actors and issues in scientiﬁc decision-making and assessment. As it included citizens and
societal ‘stakeholders’ in public debates on nanotechnologies, it necessarily democratized the
debate in ways that potentially undercut the artiﬁcial separation between scientiﬁc practice
and policy-making (Martin and Richards 1995, 525). Yet, one does not ﬁnd the notion of demo-
cratization in NanoSoc sources. This oversight is because NanoSoc initiators invoked delibera-
tion purely on substantive grounds; i.e. they framed public participation in science as a means of
achieving qualitatively better science policies, not as a way of bringing the sciences into democ-
racy. Similarly, although initiators invoked procedural norms for all project participants to adhere
to, they left unspeciﬁed how their normative, procedural vision of participation draws on delib-
erative ideals and democratic theory. Thus, deliberative TA practitioners in NanoSoc did not
articulate or develop the principle of democracy to which they implicitly adhere (see Genus
2006).
There are at least two good reasons why it would greatly beneﬁt processes like NanoSoc if TA
practitioners were to articulate such a principle. First, invoking deliberation on democratic, rather
than on substantive grounds only, urges TA initiators to make explicit the normative standards
against which participatory process is designed. Rather than operating on the assumption that par-
ticipants in a TAwill adhere to implied norms, such as reciprocity, fairness, and transparency, in
their interactions, the success of a TA would be deﬁned with respect to whether and how these
deliberative democratic criteria were met in practice. Accordingly, the achievements of TA
process would be measured against a standard of democratic legitimacy instead of against the
end of achieving better technoscientiﬁc outcomes or policies only.
Second, as explicitly stating the terms of deliberation brings the process itself into focus
(rather than the inputs and outputs of participation), project participants would be more symme-
trically positioned to negotiate the terms of their engagement upfront. Thus, rather than having to
simply accept, or experience, the deliberative rationale underlying TA, participants would ideally
be provided with an opportunity ﬁrst to discuss with one another the basic project approach (i.e.
deliberative, collaborative, interdisciplinary inquiry). The potential advantage of opening discus-
sion on these issues for TA practitioners is that they can urge other parties at the table to acknowl-
edge the importance of mutual learning and experimentation with new forms of sociotechnical
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governance, rather than narrowing deliberation down to instrumental imperatives only, such as
inﬂuencing policy-making and educating citizens about science.
In short, by making explicit the democratic norms and deliberative design criteria that
(already) inform TA processes like NanoSoc, it becomes possible to conceive of TA as a demo-
cratic sociotechnical practice that is both attentive to the political micro-realities of deliberation
(e.g. strategic action, disruptive behavior) and explicitly puts up deliberation itself for discussion
in project practice. It would also force TA practitioners to operationally deﬁne each term of ‘good
deliberation’ (e.g. reciprocity), so that the process can be appraised more or less independently
from the outcomes it generates.14
A next, related, recommendation would be to urge TA practitioners to clearly distinguish delib-
eration from participation. In many TA practices, the two concepts are simply lumped together to
characterize different kinds of ‘participatory TA’, including discursive (Döbert 1997), public (Van
Eijndhoven and Van Est 2000), and interactive TA (Grin, Van de Graaf, and Hoppe 1997). Yet, fol-
lowing Mutz (2006, 3), deliberation and participation represent different, probably incompatible
democratic political cultures. Whereas, deliberative democrats seek to encourage rational–critical
debate in which participants effectively listen to the other side and probe their own assumptions for
the sake of mutual learning and building understanding between various parties and interests; par-
ticipatory democrats cultivate political activism. That is, theymobilize like-minded individuals and
groups as partisans in order to impact policy. Whereas, deliberative democrats emphasize respect
for differences of opinion and tolerance; participatory democrats seek to arouse passion for their
cause, thus discouraging mutual listening and dissent in practice.
Although Mutz writes in the context of the contemporary USA, her message is relevant for
European TA and RI. As mentioned earlier, in the NanoSoc project nanoscientists, industry repre-
sentatives, and relevant others conceived of NanoSoc primarily as a vehicle for impacting policy
processes. In this understanding, impact is achieved by aligning the different interests of parties
involved in a TA into a common interest and making that common interest heard in the policy
arena. TA researchers, on the other hand, would often stress that a mutual exploration of view-
points is more important than what participation produces in terms of substantive outcomes –
thus underlining the conditional status of results and the importance of due process. One could
argue that different conceptions of democracy are at play here (deliberative, participatory, and
representative), which has implications for how participants to TA value, and deal with, dissent.
At the very least then, Mutz’s differentiation between participation and deliberation should encou-
rage TA practitioners and advocates of RI to reﬂect on process design and the – potentially con-
ﬂicting – rationales that sustain it. Her distinction can also help practitioners to articulate and
develop, in more precise wordings, the aims they seek to instigate through deliberative or partici-
patory processes and how these in turn relate to the system of representative democracy at large.
3.2.3. The authoritative allocation of values
Although no formal follow-up study was conducted that assessed the institutional impacts of the
NanoSoc project, it is fair to say that NanoSoc had no tangible effect on strategic science decision-
making in the two R&D centers involved in the NanoSoc process. NanoSoc initiators themselves
acknowledge this conclusion as a ‘shortcoming’, even if some nanoscientists showed great enthu-
siasm for the project throughout its duration and continued to do so after the project was ofﬁcially
terminated (Van Oudheusden and De Zutter 2012). A possible reason for the lack of institutional
impact is that NanoSoc initiators insisted on the so-called substantive or quality argument for
deliberation, i.e. the conviction that decisions, policies, and assessments beneﬁt in quality from
the inclusion of as many viewpoints as possible, thus enabling factors that previously escaped
technical decision-making to be captured and integrated into science and technology policy
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(Cass 2006, 9). A too strong emphasis on producing ‘better’ substantive outcomes comes with the
risk of overlooking, and ignoring, the importance of instrumental rationales (e.g. supporting pre-
conceived, often short-term policy commitments) for policy- and strategic decision-makers.
Second, NanoSoc speciﬁcally targeted nanotechnologists and their strategic research agendas
rather than science and technology policy-making at large. The choice to single out scientists in
laboratories was motivated both by such programmatic concerns as the urge to make scientists
more reﬂexive and responsible, as well as practical constraints of time and money. It is not
hard to grasp the inherent limits of focusing exclusively on one level or one community of
decision-making. Such concentrated efforts are likely to be a lot more effective when they are stra-
tegically combined with other RI or RI-related activities and integrated into full-ﬂedged research
programs that comprise research and systems analysis, science policy assessments, public value
mapping (Bozeman 2005), midstream modulation (Fisher 2007), future studies, organization
studies, scenario planning, vision assessments (Grin and Grünwald 2002), and other anticipatory
governance initiatives.
It is on these latter notes that I conclude my comparison between deliberative TA approaches
like NanoSoc and RI conceptions more broadly. Arguably, as a policy paradigm, RI fares better
than deliberative TA, as the former is motivated by substantive considerations, as well as norma-
tive and instrumental ones (Owen, Macnaghten, and Stilgoe 2012; EC 2013, 23). It is particularly
important that RI promises and delivers tangible, instrumental short-term policy impacts so that
RI is not lost on policy-makers. I also stress the importance of tying TA and RI into formal, repre-
sentative policy processes. As the NanoSoc case indicates, targeting scientists and scientiﬁc com-
munities in R&D labs is insufﬁcient to effectuate real policy change, as larger decisions are made
elsewhere. The advantage of RI is that it speaks through established policy voices (such as von
Schomberg’s) and ties into strategic EU policy programs, such as the EU’s 2020 Vision for a
European Research Area. Advocates of RI should strategically exploit this advantage if they
are serious about molding the science–society relationship to match their normative vision.
However, like deliberative TA, the way RI is theorized to occur is problematic. Proponents of
deliberation and RI repeatedly fail to consider their own politics and fail to present deliberation
as a political activity, imbued as it is with ongoing processes of contestation and subversion that
do not necessarily lead toward mutually gratifying outcomes (Van Oudheusden 2011b). The
rather naive conception of deliberation as a constructive, mutually responsive enterprise that har-
monizes scientiﬁc and social interests and values needs to be made more political if RI is to make
headway as a strategic orientation and durable policy commitment in the years to come.
4. Conclusion
This article asks how responsible innovation (RI) is presented and elaborated, based on general deﬁ-
nitions of RI on the EU policy level, and on a close examination of RI through a local, Flemish, TA
level. It argues that RI is best understood as a normative–political orientation that seeks to alter the
present sociotechnical order through deliberative public engagement processes in science and tech-
nology. RI is therefore steeped in the philosophy of deliberative democracy and in social construc-
tivist approaches of science. To the extent that RI accords with broader technology and innovation
agendas (e.g. a neoliberal language of governance) and effectively harmonizes contending inter-
ests, RI could develop into a new form of ‘governmentality’; that is, a strategy to intervene in
science and technology in order to rationalize actions and actors (Rose 1999, 28).
Because RI proponents act to change the world, so to speak, they engage in politics in a broad
sense. Yet politics, as well as power, are not sufﬁciently theorized or acknowledged within the RI
framework. It is therefore necessary to open RI and RI enactments to political critique, with the
aim of remedying the shortcomings of RI. This article proposes: (1) making visible how actors
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involved in deliberation actually negotiate the terms of their engagement rather than assuming that
deliberation improves the quality of decisions and enhances democracy; (2) opening up discus-
sion among all involved parties on the politics of deliberative engagement, including the
process norms that govern interaction (e.g. reciprocity) and the substantive biases inherent in
RI (e.g. ethical concerns outweigh economic concerns); and (3) acknowledging that contempor-
ary conceptions of RI are institutionally weak and that RI has only a limited institutional problem-
solving capacity, as deliberative outcomes cannot be enforced in the policy arena.
The various shortcomings in the RI frame provide an opportunity to propose an alternative
frame that counters the overtly one-dimensional presentation of RI as an ethical, inclusive, and
responsive endeavor:
. Problem deﬁnition: RI is too much about talk, argumentation, and due process.
. Problematization: Failing to consider how RI processes are imbued with politics renders RI
politically weak.
. Treatment recommendation: Make RI more political by attending to the politics in and of
RI, and the institutional uptake of RI.
Whether or not RI advocates will ﬁnd this reframing of RI along more politically sensitive criteria
compelling is an open question, intricately bound up with the questions of how, when, where, and
why to engage in politics. Although advocates of RI must work within the dominant policy
framing of science and technology as an area distinct from politics, ethics, law, etc., there is a
risk in accommodating these facile distinctions. For one, the seemingly non-political talk of
responsibility and innovation obscures how political acts of inclusion and exclusion play out
through RI discourses, processes, and tools. Questions as to how policy-makers and deliberative
practitioners draw boundaries, for instance, should always remain in focus. If not, a situation may
arise in which RI proponents avoid critically examining their own commitments and do not even
consider whether these work. Second, the non-political character of RI is hard to sustain on sub-
stantive grounds, even if we adopt a narrow deﬁnition of politics as partisan politics. In some
countries and regions (notably in Flanders, but also in the USA; see Laporte 2013), RI-associated
institutes such as TA ofﬁces are explicitly associated with political parties on the left side of the
political spectrum and/or with a political preference for more participatory or deliberative modes
of decision-making (Van Oudheusden et al. 2013). In such cases, presenting RI to policy-makers
as a politically neutral tool risks trivializing and undermining the very policy changes RI advo-
cates seek to instigate. Adopting a more politically laden language of agendas, interests,
impacts, and power may be an unconventional and provocative choice of policy strategy, but
may ultimately be more fruitful.
Whichever political options proponents of RI decide upon, it is essential that these options are
discussed and critically considered within the RI community. This article attempts to serve as a
useful starting point for such a debate. It does not urge advocates of RI to agree with each and
every observation raised, but to take the spirit of critical self-inquiry to heart. It thereby provides
a strategic opportunity for building into RI agendas a permanent capacity for critical self-reﬂec-
tion on the norms, assumptions, and aims that inform these agendas, in ways that resonate with
TA attempts at building reﬂexivity into ‘innovation governance’.
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Notes
1. Throughout this article, I use the term RI, unless when citing, or referring to, authors who explicitly use
the term RRI. The ﬁrst term is more compelling than the second, as RI potentially encompasses all
kinds of aspirations and processes, including social innovations, system innovations, corporate respon-
sibility, etc. that exceed and extend the context of science- and technology-driven research and
innovation.
2. I leave open the question as to what ‘effective policy outcomes’ entail. It is more important to note that
RI is integrative in scope and character, as it is motivated not only by instrumental imperatives, but also
by normative and substantive ones. I return to this point and the distinctions between these RI impera-
tives in Section 3 of this article.
3. See, for instance, the EC’s 2013 Report on Strengthening Options for RRI, where it is explicitly stated
that the development of science and technology fails due to the relative lack of societal acceptance of
science and technology research: ‘(… ) there are many examples in which the outcomes of research
has [sic] been contested, because social and ethical aspects have not been adequately taken into con-
sideration in the development of innovation’ (emphasis added) (EC 2013, 3).
4. In what follows, I deliberately speak of deliberative governance (and deliberative TA approaches)
rather than participatory governance, as deliberation and participation are distinctly different in
scope, aims, and character. I expound on this difference in Section 3 of this article.
5. See Owen, Macnaghten, and Stilgoe (2012) for an overview and a brief contextualization of RI-related
notions.
6. Like postnormal science and related frameworks, RI views scientiﬁc knowledge as a social construct
rather than as a historical or epistemic given. Hence, RI directs our attention toward the context(s) of
scientiﬁc knowledge rather than to scientiﬁc truth in an absolute sense. For more on (social) construc-
tivism as the dominant science policy paradigm, see Jasanoff (2003); for more on constructivist studies
of science, including the Social Construction of Technology approach, see Pinch and Bijker (1984).
7. As Mills (2013) of the Nufﬁeld Council on Bioethics writes, ‘As a movement with a practical mission,
RI has to come up with a normative programme that responds to the perceived procedural failure of
markets and the epistemic failure of governments to manage innovation effectively for social good’
(emphasis added).
8. The understanding of politics as the authoritative allocation of values for society is of course derived
from Easton (1965).
9. Studies that measure the impacts of deliberation on policy-making produce mixed results. It is perhaps
most accurate to state that ‘scholars do not know how deliberation affects policy options’ (Barabas
2004), although some case studies suggest that policy-makers respond to, and anticipate, changes in
public opinion (for an overview of these studies, see Stokes 1998, 125). Either way, the effects of delib-
eration on policy-making are perceived to be soft and intangible, and thus hard to measure using tra-
ditional statistical measurement.
10. For a concise overview of the various STS-inspired literatures on which project initiators drew, see
Goorden and Deblonde (2011, 55–57). Von Schomberg (2011a, 7) in turn refers to the NanoSoc
project as a ‘public engagement project’ that promisingly combines foresight and deliberation.
11. The distinction between enactors and comparative selectors is derived from Rip and Te Kulve
(2008, 52).
12. The assumption that bringing in more voices (and issues) in science ultimately leads to better policies is
implicit in Habermasian models of communicative rationality, where deliberation is presented as the
rational weighing up of arguments and counterarguments, and the various parties have in mind a
common good. Power, force relations, and antagonism appear to reside elsewhere, outside the delib-
erative process. This is not to say that NanoSoc initiators denied conﬂict between actors; rather, they
asserted that actors negotiate their different interpretations until they arrive at a solution that more or
less satisﬁes the various parties (see Klein and Kleinman 2002).
13. For a thoughtful reﬂection on deliberative facilitation and how to rethink the role of facilitators, see
Forrester (1999, 76–81).
14. For a similar argumentation in relation to deliberative science and technology governance, see Löv-
brand, Pielke Jr., and Beck (2011).
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